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STATE AND MARKET IN THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER
Fritz Ossenbiihl*
I. THE MARKET AS A CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE
HE state relies upon a functioning economy, and the economy,
even the free market economy, cannot fulfill its function without
state protection and the infrastructure of a legal order. This con-
nection suggests that the constitution, as the basic legal order of a state,
makes the relationship between the state and the economy one of its sub-
jects by making a direct statement on it.1 The German Basic Law, how-
ever, remains silent. The Bonn Constitution does not contain any
specifically shaped economic order or any explicit statement on the insti-
tutionalization of a particular economic system.
The fact that the Basic Law does not explicitly declare a particular eco-
nomic order part of the constitution has its obvious reason in the history
of the origin of the Basic Law. Its drafters, of course, did recognize the
importance of an economic order for the state. However, among and
within the various political forces involved, namely the political parties,
there was an irreconcilable disagreement on how an economic order
should be developed so that-on the basis of the experiences and views at
that time-no consensus on that issue could be reached.2 Thus, the ab-
sence of a constitutional provision on the economic order is neither the
result of a mistake on the part of the constitutional legislator, nor an in-
voluntary gap in the Basic Law, but rather is an "eloquent silence" of the
drafters of the constitution. It is rather a conscious, deliberate non-deci-
sion to leave open a controversial question. While it is true that the Basic
Law has not explicitly installed a particular economic order as a whole, it
does contain many single provisions that are relevant to the economy.
These provisions show themselves to be constituent elements of a market
order, its brick and corner stones that give clear and constitutionally well-
founded instructions for the development of an economic system.
These constituent elements encompass contractual liberty, economic
freedom, the guarantee of private property, the freedom of price fixing,
the freedom of competition, the freedom of movement, the freedom of
* Institute for Public Law, University of Bonn, Germany.
1. For a constitutional market theory, see Peter Haberle, Soziale Marktwirtschaft als
"Dritter Weg", ZRP 383 (1993).
2. See Martin Kriele, Wirtschafisfreiheit und Grundgesetz, ZRP 105 (1974).
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expression, and the freedom to advertise. These elements and founda-
tions, which both make the market possible and constitute it at the same
time, are guaranteed by corresponding constitutional civil rights in the
Basic Law. The civil rights that are relevant to the economy ensure that
the market is a "spontaneous order" and contain the basic pattern of an
economic system that constitutes a "model of a free market order."
Without prejudice to the legislature's discretion in its economic policy,
the Federal Constitutional Court seems correct in its formulation: "The
existing economic constitution contains, as one of its basic principles, free
competition between the entrepreneurs acting as supplier and
demander."'3
The discussion on the economic order, which, in particular, took place
in the early period of the Basic Law,4 was curtailed in the following years.
In accordance with the adjudication of the Federal Constitutional Court,
the discussion shifted to the individual economic rights, particularly occu-
pational liberty and economic freedom protected by Article 12, section 1
of the Basic Law. In light of the developments in the last decade, how-
ever, a renaissance is not to be expected to stem from this discussion.
Notably, two developments historically overtook each other and showed
that the issue of economic order cannot be viewed solely from the per-
spective of a national constitution, which, in the case of Germany, is the
Basic Law: the reunification of Germany and the advanced European
integration by the Maastricht Treaty of 1992.
One of the main problems of German reunification, apart from restor-
ing legal unity, was integrating the east German states (Ldnder) into the
economic order of the Federal Republic. The collapse of the former Ger-
man Democratic Republic was a political and economic bankruptcy. The
socialist economic system with its emphasis on a centrally controlled mar-
ket had led the German Democratic Republic into financial ruin. The
revolution of 1989 was not only a vote for a free democracy but also a
vote for an economic order as it existed in West Germany, which was
seen as the economic system of constitutional democracy. The transition
from the ruined socialist economic system of the German Democratic Re-
public to a free market order was thus a central subject of the Treaty on
Monetary, Economic, and Social Union of May 18, 19905 that preceded
reunification.
Article 1, section 3 of this treaty between the Federal Republic of Ger-
many and the German Democratic Republic states, "The economic union
is based on the principle of social market economy 6 as the economic or-
3. BVerfGE 32, 311 (317); see also RUPERr SCHOLZ, ENTFLECHTUNO UND VERFAS-
SUNG 90 (1981).
4. See REINER SCHMIDr, OFFENTLICHES WIRTSCHAFrSRECHT 68 (1990).
5. Treaty on Monetary, Economic, and Social Union, v. 18.5.1990 (BGBI. II S. 537);
see also KLAUS STERN & BRUNO SCHMIDTBLEIn3TREU, STAATSVERTRAG ZUR WAHRUNGS-,
WIRTSCHAFTS- UND SOZIALUNION (1990).
6. The term "social market economy" must not be confused with "socialist market
order." While the latter is based on the concept of a state-controlled market, the former
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der of both parties."'7 Seven elements of social market economy were
listed in a common protocol that became part of the treaty pursuant to
article 4, section 1.8 The protocol thus laid down in a legal form those
components that are commonly considered characteristic elements of a
social market economy.
Superimposed on this is the European development. To further de-
velop the European Union by creating a distinct economic and monetary
union, the Maastricht Treaty of February 7, 1992, inserted article 3a into
the EC Treaty. This provision obliges both the European Community
and its member states to adopt an economic policy that is "conducted in
accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free com-
petition."9 While it is true that the member states keep the responsibility
for their "own" economic policy, article 1 02a of the EC Treaty reaffirms
the obligation set up in Article 3a by repeating that the member states
shall conduct their economic policy "in accordance with the principle of
an open market economy with free competition.' 10 This statement ranks
as so-called primary community law; its application has, therefore, prior-
ity over the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany. At the same
time, article 3a, section 1 of the EC Treaty restricts the national constitu-
tional legislator in that it bars constitutional changes that would lead
away from the "open market economy with free competition."" It fol-
lows that the Basic Law cannot be interpreted other than for the pur-
poses of an "open economic market with free competition."
means a free market economy with social elements, such as minimum wages, minimum
social security benefits, pension plans, protection against unfair dismissal, etc. See Horst
Siebert, Principles of the Economic System in the Federal Republic-An Economist's View,
in 14 GERMANY AND ITS BASIC LAW: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE: A GERMAN-AMERI-
CAN SYMPOSIUM 293 (Paul Kirchhof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993).
7. Treaty on Monetary, Economic, and Social Union, supra note 5.
8. See id. These elements are:
1. Economic production and services shall primarily be made and rendered by private
enterprises and in a competitive market.
2. Contractual liberty is guaranteed. The freedom of commercial activities shall be re-
stricted as little as possible.
3. Entrepreneurial decisions are unrestricted by plan targets (i.e., in terms of production,
supply, delivery, investments, employments, prices, and the allocation of the net profit).
4. Private enterprises and free professions shall not be treated less favorably than state
enterprises and co-operative enterprises.
5. Price fixing is free, unless there are urgent and compelling reasons concerning the
national economy to allow the state to fix prices.
6. The freedom to acquire, to dispose of, and to use land and other means of production
for commercial activities is guaranteed.
7. Enterprises that are directly or indirectly owned by the state are managed in accor-
dance with the principle of profitability. They are to be structured as competitors on the
market and to be transferred into private property as soon as possible. By doing that,
smaller and medium-sized enterprises in particular shall get their chances.
9. Maastricht Treaty, v. 7.2.1992 (BGB1. II S. 1253) (in French, "principle d' une





II. STATE INFLUENCE ON THE MARKET
A. STATE AND MARKET-Two SIDES OF THE EXISTENCE OF POLITY
A basic feature of German constitutional history and theory is the dif-
ferentiation between state and society. 12 The terms "state" and "society"
describe two distinct systems and legal structures. The term "state"
stands for the exercise of constitutionally legitimated power, while the
term "society" denotes the exercise of self-determination in freedom.
The society's system of order is rooted in the principle of freedom and
autonomy. In contrast to the principle of constituted state order, in a
society the societas of free men convenes. In an ideal conceptual general-
ization, "state," understood as an enforced order, contrasts with the free-
dom of "society." 13 In this contextual system the market belongs to
society. It represents the institutionalized embodiment of economic free-
dom in society, a part of social freedom and autonomy.
According to classical theory, market and society alike are subject to
their own, quasi-natural rules. The nice picture of free interplay of eco-
nomic forces that, guided by an "invisible hand,"' 4 automatically lead to
an acceptable economic order is a mere metaphor which is long since
outdated. It is true that the state can become the enemy of the market.
In a democratic constitutional system, however, its purpose makes it a
friend and a promoter of the market instead.
The state's task is to care and provide for the preservation and func-
tioning of the market. State influence is necessary, therefore, as long as it
serves as market protection. If state influence controls the market itself,
it leads to market intervention, which can turn into state dirigisme.
B. REASONS FOR AND OBJECTIVES OF STATE INFLUENCE
The reasons for and objectives of exercising state influence on the mar-
ket are quite different. The state assumes its original function when it
protects the working of the market mechanisms in that it protects and
preserves, in particular, a workable competition and constituent elements
of a free market order. 15 Above all, this involves the prevention of mo-
nopolies and the combat against unfair competition.
12. See ERNST WOLFGANG BOCKENFORDE, DIE VERFASSUNGSTHEORETISCHE UNTER-
SCHEII1UNGZ VON STAAT UND GESELLSCHAFT ALS BEDINGUNG DER INDIVII1UELLEN
FREIHEIT (1973); Die Bedeutung der Unterscheidung zwischen Staat und Gesellschaf! im
demokratischen Sozialstaat der Gegenwart, in FESTGABEFLR WOLFGANG HEFERMEHL 11
(1972); Hans Heinrich Rupp, Die Unterscheidung von Staat und Gesellschaf!, in
HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHTS § 28 (Josef Isensee & Paul Kirchhof eds., 1987).
13. See Josef Isensee, Steuerstaat als Staatsform, in FESISCHR-FIFOR HANS PETER IP-
SEN 409 (1997); Klaus Vogel, Der Finanz-und Steuerstaat, in 1 HANDIUCH DES STAAT-
SRECHTS § 27 annotation 52 (Josef Isensee & Paul Kirchhof eds., 1987).
14. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS (1776).
15. For the term "workable competition," see CHRISTIAN KOENIG, DIE OFFENTLICH-
RECHTLICHE VERTEILUNGSLENKUNG 36 (1994).
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A delicate question, however, is what kind of further corrections of the
market mechanisms are justified or even necessary under the Basic Law.
An essential element of a free market economy is the inequality of prop-
erty and income.16 This market inequality as a result of the exercise of
freedom contradicts a basic element of the constitutional order: the prin-
ciple of equality. This results in a conflict between economy and law.
How much inequality on the market can the constitutional principle of
equality endure? According to the German Constitutional Court, one of
the main commitments of civil law is "to balance disturbed parity be-
tween contracting parties. 1 7 The Court deduces from the constitution-
ally guaranteed contractual liberty, a constituent element of the market,
the legislator's obligation to restore the equilibrium of the parties in their
negotiations in case of a "structural inferiority of one contracting
party."' 18 Otherwise, the Court explains, self-determination of the con-
tracting party would not be ensured.19 At this point, the constitutional
principles of equality and market freedom oppose each other. This con-
flict is resolved through state corrections by redefining the market mech-
anism: freedom is leveled out by equality.
The traditional protection of vocation and branches of business, typical
for the German legal system, seems questionable from a constitutional
point of view. In light of economic principles, this protection must be
considered as being contrary to the system. Protecting branches of busi-
ness can be indirectly expressed in completely different statutes: prohib-
iting baking at night, Acts on Discount, or tax provisions, for example.
Nevertheless, the German Constitutional Court has declared that these
statutes, which are intended to protect the middle classes-in particular,
the small and medium-sized bakeries-against competition from large en-
terprises, give no cause for concern from a constitutional point of view. 20
The protection of particular professions is accomplished under public
law by impeding access or merging to organizations which are cut off
from the outside (so-called Verkammerung). These are remnants of old
guilds and corporations which fiercely defend themselves against any
change. The main protective instrument, impeding access to particular
professions, resulted in only ten percent of all industrial or commercial
enterprises in the Federal Republic of Germany being conducted without
a license in the 1950s.21 There is no indication that this number has now
considerably increased. Furthermore, state influence can also be moti-
vated by socio-political objectives. A well-known verdict says that the
16. See Ludwig von Mises, Artikel Markt, in HANDBUCH DER SOZIALWISSENSCHAFIEN
135 (1961).
17. BVerfGE 89, 214 (232).
18. Id.
19. See id.
20. See BVerfGE 41, 360 (372); BVerfGE 87, 363 (382); see also Fritz Ossenbuil, Die
Freiheit des Unternehmers nach dem Grundgesetz, 115 MR 1, 8 (1990); Friedhelm Hufen,
Berufsfreiheit-Erinnerung an em Grundrecht, NJW 2913, 2920 (1994).




market is anti-social. This assessment is based, in particular, on the ine-
quality of property and income inherent in the market. In that respect
the state can make corrections of market results and decide in favor of a
distribution of income and goods that deviates from the market. The con-
stitutional basis for such an intervention is the principle of social justice
and the welfare state (Sozialstaatsprinzip), which the constitutional law
considers to be a binding, basic policy clause of the constitution that is to
be further defined and implemented by the legislature.22
Another example of a legitimate socio-political objective left un-
touched by the constitutional principle of equality is health protection of
employees. The Federal Constitutional Court has, for example, justified
the prohibition on baking at night because of the "protection against
health-endangering night work, '" 23 even though protecting the middle
class against large enterprises has actually played a significant role. The
combination of different explanations leads or may lead to pretexts that
obscure legal justifications.2 4 Thus, the Shop Closing Act, for example,
can no longer be justified on grounds of protecting work hours of
employees.
C. APPROACHES AND FORMS OF STATE INFLUENCE
The number of the various approaches and forms of state influence on
the economy has so increased over the years due to different economic
developments and ideas about economic policy that they now threaten to
overpower the market. They are heterogeneous, as are their motives, in-
tentions, and objectives. These differences explain why every effort to
systematize them must inevitably fail. Thus, only a few spotlights can be
put on the network of "market regulation."
1. Global Control Through Counter-Cyclical Conjunctural Policy
(Fiscal Policy)
By the end of the sixties, at the time of the grand coalition, the minister
of economics, Schiller, believed that the state could-at least globally-
effectively control market conditions and economic crises. Accordingly,
in 1967 Article 109 of the Basic Law was revised to provide a basis for
global state control of the economy. Pursuant to the new provision, both
the federal government and the states (Lander) are obliged to take into
account the requirements of the macro-economic equilibrium in budget-
ary matters. This constitutional amendment was accompanied by the
adoption of the Act to Promote Stability and Economic Growth of June
8, 1967.25
22. See Hans F. Zacher, Das soziale Staatsziel, in I HANOBUCH DES STAATSRECHTS
§ 25 annotation 80 (Josef Isensee & Paul Kirchhof eds., 1987).
23. BverfGE 23, 50 (58); BVerfGE 41, 360 (370); BVerfGE 87, 363 (385).
24. See Hufen, supra note 20, at 2920.
25. Act to Promote Stability and Economic Growth, v. 8.6.1967 (13GBI. I S. 582).
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The amendment was based on the economic theory of J.M. Keynes,
who believed that the continuous economic cycles observed in the second
half of the 19th century could be influenced through fiscal measures. Ac-
cording to Keynes, it was economically necessary and politically
mandatory both to adjust state fiscal and budgetary policy to a counter-
cyclical control of economic cycles and to provide for the necessary legal
instruments, particularly in modern industrialized countries.
2 6
The question as to whether such global control measures fall into the
scope of civil rights, which are (only) to protect against concrete and indi-
vidual encroachments, is to be assessed on a case by case basis but is
likely to be answered in the negative. 27 Further considerations are un-
necessary because the fiscal-political approach in practice was not of a
significance worth mentioning.
In addition, the stability-oriented political influence of the state does
have a vulnerable flank. Because of the guarantee of trade union free-
dom and collective bargaining autonomy in Article 9, section 3 of the
Basic Law, the influence on wages, which are usually reflected in the
prices of goods and services, remains beyond state control. Instead, the
influence is handed over to both sides of industry: management and la-
bor, employers and employees.
2 8
2. Supervision of the Economy
As noted, the borderline between the state as the protective guard on
the one hand and decision-making guardian on the other hand can easily
and unknowingly be overstepped. Grey areas and intermediate zones ex-
ist, particularly in the ramified regulations concerning the supervision of
economy, which are typical for the Federal Republic of Germany.
29
As such, supervision is, in principle, distinct from measures to control
the economy. Supervision is not intended to control or influence the
market but rather to protect individual and common interests inherent in
the market mechanisms against specific endangering. 30 However, the dif-
ference between theory and practice can be considerable, and supervision
can easily turn into control.
In Germany, state supervision of economy has been a tradition for cen-
turies.31 At the outset, it was only concerned with the mining industry (as
26. See BVerfGE 79, 311 (331).
27. See KLAUS STERN ET AL., GESETZ ZUR FORDERUNG DER STABILITrT UND DES
WACHS'FUMS DER WIRTSCHAFT: KOMMENTAR 87 (2d ed. 1972).
28. See ULRICH SCHEUNER, DIE STAATLICHE EINWIRKUNG AUF DIE WIRTSCHAFT 54
(1971). However, it should be noted that the law of collective (wage) agreements has come
under pressure due to increasing globalization. See Manfred Lowisch, Arbeitsrecht und
wirtschafilicher Wandel, RDA 69, 75 (1999).
29. See Martin Bullinger, Staatsaufsicht in der Wirtschaf, 22 VVDSTRL 264 (1965);
EKKEHARD STEIN, DIE WIRTSCHAFISAUFSICHT (1967); PETER J. TETIfINGER, RECHT-
SANWENDUNG UND GERICHTLICHE KONTROLLE IM WIRTSCHAFISVERWALTUNGSRECHT
(1980); HEINZ MOSBAUER, STAATSAUFSICHT USER DIE WIRTSCHAFT (1990).
30. See Bullinger, supra note 29, at 286; SCHEUNER, supra note 28, at 71.
31. See Bullinger, supra note 29, at 286; MOSBAUER, supra note 32, at 16.
2000]
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a result of state supreme authority over mining), pharmacies, the restau-
rant industry, railroads, shipping, and the fishing industry. With an in-
creasing economic development, the range of supervised industries
broadened. Today, it also covers areas like banks, trade, aviation, anti-
trust, passenger transport, trucking, energy supply, nuclear power, emis-
sion control, and insurance. State supervision of the economy has a
variety of possible measures at its disposal, such as information gathering,
inspections, controlling, licensing, and approval of prices. Its objectives
are not restricted to protecting against endangering; it also aims at meet-
ing the state's expectations with regard to its policy for the improvement
of regional structure and for the promotion of economic growth. From a
constitutional point of view, state supervision of the economy reflects the
conflict between economic rights and freedoms as guaranteed in the Ba-
sic Law on the one hand and the principle of social justice and the welfare
state on the other hand. In this area of conflict, it is up to the legislator to
define and determine the balance between the rights and principles in-
volved. Because legislators lack regulatory capability, however, the com-
petence to resolve the conflict is often transferred to the administration
through ambiguous regulations and, correspondingly, general terms in
statutes.3
2
This leads to considerable constitutional and practical problems be-
cause the supervisory bodies are thus given the opportunity to over-
stretch their mandate and to regulate the economic dispositions of
enterprises. If this is done with reference to incorrect and legally un-
founded assessment criteria, as in the case of the Federal Banking Super-
visory Board, state supervision turns not only into guardianship but also
into a bureaucracy of constraint and prevention.
3. Market Regulation
In this context, one should mention the privatization of the postal ser-
vice and telecommunication as well as the economic implications of this
process. Postal service and telecommunication are traditionally assigned
to the state. Initially, the Basic Law made them part of the functions of
the federal government. 33 However, due to increasing stress of competi-
tion in the globally-oriented postal and telecommunication market, the
German Postal Service (Deutsche Bundespost) was closed down in several
steps, and the postal service and telecommunication became part of the
private sector.34
32. See TE-rrINGER, supra note 29.
33. See GG art. 87, § 1 (old version).
34. See Klaus Stern, Postreform zwischenPrivatisierungundlnfrastrukturgewhrleistung,
DVB1. 309 (1997); Peter Badura, Wetbewerbsaufsicht und lnfrastrukturgewahrleistung
durch Regulierung im Bereich der Post und Telekomunikation, in FESTSCHR-FrFHR BERN-
HARD GROFIFELD 35 (1999); Martin Bullinger, Von administrativer Daseinsvorsorge zu
privatwirtschaftlicher Leistung unter staatlicher Rahmengarantie, in FESTSCHR-FIFLI R HANS
F. ZACHER 85 (1998).
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By adding Article 87f to the Basic Law in 1994, the services of Deutsche
Bundespost, which until then had been services of the federal administra-
tion, were transformed into private services and were rendered thereafter
by private enterprises as successors of Deutsche Bundespost. This consti-
tutes a real privatization of functions: The state has given up one of its
constitutionally assigned functions and put it under the rules of the mar-
ket, thus opening the market in the field of postal service and
telecommunication. 35
However, this fundamental change of system in a field that concerns
and influences the whole economy does involve risks. Due to the tradi-
tional monopolistic structure, a functioning market cannot exist right
from the beginning. Furthermore, there are some apprehensions that, in
view of the now cost-oriented enterprises, gaps in supply might occur in
rural regions. That is why Article 87f, section 1 of the Basic Law obliges
the state to guarantee that "the field of postal service and telecommuni-
cation services are adequately and sufficiently rendered in all areas."'36
This constitutional obligation to guarantee a sufficient infrastructure (in
European law terminology, "guarantee of universal services") leads to
residual state functions in this field, which are assumed by a newly estab-
lished regulatory agency (Regulierungsbehorde).37
Regulation is sometimes considered to be a form of supervision of the
economy. 38 However, keeping in mind its intention, one has to admit
that it goes beyond mere supervision. 39 Regulation not only involves en-
suring fair competition by protecting against monopolies, but also aims at
securing a particular economic result: maintaining a sufficient communi-
cation infrastructure through a "basic supply in all areas," which must not
be sacrificed to the cost-oriented management of private enterprises.
That is why the regulation agency is vested with a broad range of far-
reaching instruments, which encompass licensing, supervising part per-
formances, and price fixing. The legal literature has already created new
expressions for this kind of function, such as "state infrastructure respon-
sibility" and "guarantee state."'40
From the perspective of a consumer, who has particularly benefited
from dramatic price reductions in the field of telecommunication, this de-
velopment has proved to be a promising start. One can only hope that
the state will not dilute this again through a "solicitous siege."
35. See Stern, supra note 34, at 310.
36. GG art. 87f, § 1.
37. See Badura, supra note 34, at 47.
38. See id. at 40.
39. See JENS-PETER SCHNEIDER, LIBERALISIERUNG DER STROMIFRTSCHAFT DURCH
REGULATIVE MARKTORGANISATION 37 (1999).
40. GEORG HERMES, STAATLICHE INFRASTRUKTURVERANTWORTUNG (1998); Wolf-





Market control can occur in the form of direct and indirect behavior
control. Both kinds of state influence on the market have their own con-
stitutional problems and aspects.
State market control through direct behavior control concerns, in par-
ticular, market access, or, in terms of civil rights, the freedom to choose
one's profession, as guaranteed in Article 12, section 1 of the Basic Law.
In most cases, career choice, and thus market access, are dependent on
individual qualifications and characteristics. In that sense, it is subject to
a particular access control in the form of a prohibition with the reserva-
tion of the granting of permission. In trade and industry law, personal
"reliability," defined in relation to the concrete business concerned, plays
an important role. Access to a particular commercial activity can be im-
peded not only through personal prerequisites, but also by regulating the
management (quota restrictions, numerous clauses, monopolizing) in va-
rious fields such as passenger transport, admission as social health insur-
ance doctor, or access to municipal markets. 41 In addition, numerous
provisions regulate the exercise of professions to ensure quality standards
in order to protect the consumer or to regulate prices.
The Federal Constitutional Court applies the standard of Article 12,
section 1 of the Basic Law when reviewing statutes that are relevant for
professions. Its adjudication started powerfully and courageously in 1957
with the "pharmacy-judgement," 42 which redressed the public need test
and was therefore regarded as a landmark decision. It soon weakened,
however, with the so-called "handicraft-decision," 43 which involved the
question of whether a master craftsman's qualifying examination is a nec-
essary prerequisite for conducting an independent trade. In general,
from today's point of view the Federal Constitutional Court's adjudica-
tion is considered to be too favorable toward the legislature. 4
4
In these days, the old instrument of indirect behavior control has come
into fashion again. It can be found, in particular, in environmental law.
45
Through financial incentives a certain desired behavior is promoted,
whereas undesired behavior is hoped to be prevented. Public duties and
taxes, in the form of taxes linked to production or emissions, for example,
are supposed to make the use of the environment a factor of internal
corporate costs. Thus, the use of the environment becomes part of the
market mechanisms; through product prices, competition mechanisms
and preventive effects are therefore triggered. This concept of internal-
ization of environmental costs as a method of environmental policy that is
41. See Rudiger Breuer, Die staatliche Berufsregelung und Wirtschafislenkung, in IV
HANDBUCH DES STAATrSRECHTS § 148 annotation 47 (Josef Isensee & Paul Kirchhof eds.,
1989).
42. BVerfGE 7, 377.
43. BVerfGE 13, 97.
44. See Friedhelm Hufen, Berufsfreiheit-Erinnerung an em Grundrecht, NJW 2913
(1994).
45. See MICHAEL KLOEPFER & THIOL BRANDNER, UMWELTRECHTI 263 (2d ed. 1998).
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in conformity with the market is generally accepted today. Its legal im-
plementation, however, involves considerable problems. The tax state as
an element and the basis of the constitutional state dedicated to social
justice contradicts, in principle, the vision of an "environment state. ' 46
The tax state guarantees liberty and equality of its citizens in that it
does not force them to behave in a particular manner but rather levies
taxes on them according to their individual ability to bear public costs.
There is a fundamental conflict between the exercise of personal freedom
and environmental protection. Effective environmental protection can
call for far-reaching interferences with civil rights and freedoms and can
lead, through environmental taxes, to behavior control. This control not
only limits the exercise of freedom but also is likely to contradict the
principle of equality and the principle of social justice and the welfare
state. These, however, are dangers that depend on the design of concrete
concepts of control.
Also feasible are effective instruments which work in a way that gives
no cause for concern from a constitutional point of view. 47 One of the
instruments of indirect behavior control is the state subsidy. Here, the
constitutional problems are less severe. The "giving state" can much eas-
ier be justified than the "taking state." In the economic sector, subsidies
to individual enterprises can lead to distortion of competition or, in terms
of civil rights, to an infringement of competitive equality and freedom of
competition. 48 This, however, does not mean that subsidies, as such, are
excluded. The existence of subsidies instead depends on the extent of
preferential treatment of the individual enterprise and, respectively, on
the degree to which its competitor is put at a disadvantage. Since there is
no concrete constitutional criterion for this extent or degree, everything
depends on the assessment by the court. 49 Thus, economic subsidies are
less a constitutional problem than a financial problem. According to
figures provided by the Institute of World Economy, state subsidies have
reached the amount of DM 290 billion, which is more than one third of
public revenue.50
D. REVIEW OF STATE MARKET INTERVENTION BY THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
Judicial review of state market intervention primarily takes place
46. Michael Kloepfer, Droht derautoritare okologische Staat?, in WEGE ZUM OKO-
LOGISCHEN RECHTSSTAAT: UM WELTSCHUTZ OHNE OKO-DI KTATUR 42 (Hubertus
Baumeister ed., 1994).
47. See KLOEPFER, supra note 45, at 316 (waste water levy).
48. See Breuer, supra note 41; PETER-MICHAEL HUBER, KONKURRENZSCHUTZ IM
VERWALTUNGSRECHT: SCHUTZANSPRUCH UND RECHTSSCHUTZ BEI LENKUNGS-UND
VERTEILUNGSENTSCHEIDUNG EN DER OFFENTLIECHEN VERWALTUNG 135 (1991).
49. See Breuer, supra note 41 ("strangulating subsidies").
50. See Wolfgang Mulke, Der schwere Kampf gegen die Subventionitis, BONNER
GENERALANZEIGER, Apr. 24-25, 1999, at 32.
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through the Federal Constitutional Court. 51 Its adjudication is very ex-
tensive, encompassing, in ninety-eight volumes of official records, 300 de-
cisions involving interferences with occupational liberty.52
1. Constitutional Criteria for Judicial Review
Constitutional criteria for judicial review are economic rights and free-
doms, such as contractual liberty, freedom of competition, occupational
liberty, liberty to establish and carry on any trade and industry, freedom
of opinion, freedom of movement, and freedom of association. The most
important criterion is occupational liberty, as guaranteed in Article 12,
section 1 of the Basic Law. Less important is the constitutional guarantee
of the right to property, as embedded in Article 14 of the Basic Law.
The Federal Constitutional Court only concerns itself with state market
intervention by means of statutes adopted by Parliament. Statutes that
interfere with occupational liberty or other economic rights and freedoms
also include tax statutes if they have an "objective tendency to regulate
professions '53 in that their actual effects relate to the exercise of a profes-
sion. Market interventions in the form of profession-regulating statutes
need a sufficient justification under the Basic Law. Such a justification is
possible if public interests are concerned, as long as both the interference
and public interests are appropriate under the principle of proportional-
ity.54 The more intensive the interference, the more important and obvi-
ous justifying public interests must be. This method of justification, as a
rule, refers to the entire sector of the economy concerned, rather than to
the concrete and individual case. Thus, a generalizing and typifying ap-
proach of the legislature is possible.55
2. Standard of Review Formula and Discretion of the Legislature
Economic policy is particularly ambivalent in terms of constitutional
law. On the one hand, the Basic Law does not contain any guideline as to
the economic policy, thus leaving a maximum of political discretion to the
legislature. On the other hand, almost all economically relevant statutes
interfere with economic rights and freedoms. Economic discretion and
responsibility of economic policy thus conflict with the protection of civil
rights and freedoms. This conflict cannot be resolved by a simple "Eco-
51. This, in particular, is true for market intervention by means of a statute. As to
market interventions through individual regulation (e.g., subsidies, warning of particular
products), legal protection can be sought from administrative courts or civil courts (e.g., in
case of violations of the Act Against Unfair Competition). Judgments of administrative or
civil courts of last instance can be brought to the Federal Constitutional Court by means of
a constitutional complaint based on an allegation of infringement of constitutional rights.
52. See Winfried Kluth, Bundesverfassungsgericht undwirtschafilenkende Gesetzge-
bung, ZHR 657 (1998), who counts 299 decisions in ninety-six volumes of official records.
In the meantime, further judgments involving occupational liberty have been rendered.
53. BVerfGE 95, 267 (302).
54. See Fritz Ossenbiuhl, Die Freiheiten des Unternehmers nach dem Grundgesetz, 115
AOR 10 (1990).
55. See BVerfGE 68, 193 (219).
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nomic-Question-Doctrine," as is sometimes evoked in legal literature.5 6
The Federal Constitutional Court has always seen the Basic Law as a con-
stitution that is normative through and through. It has also emphasized
this nonnativity where constitutional standards of review can hardly be
translated into applicable formulas, as is the case, for example, in the con-
stitutional financial system.5 7 The field of economic law also espouses
this view. The question is not whether, but to what extent, economic law
is subject to judicial review by the Federal Constitutional Court. This
review cannot be conducted according to a standardized scheme. Rather,
it depends on the rationality of the particular statute that is subject to
review and on other circumstances, such as the intensity of interference
or the uncertainty of economic predictions that form the basis of the
statute.
Such a flexibility of judicial review adjusted to the subject matter and
statute in question can easily be achieved through the use of review for-
mulas. This kind of review essentially involves the question of whether
the statute under review can be justified by public interests. These inter-
ests, however, are not defined in the Basic Law, 58 but are instead subject
to the disposition of the legislator, who decides on his or her own what
does and what does not serve public interests.
In this way, even the "preservation of a productive domestic wine
growing industry" assumes the status of constitutionally relevant public
interests that may justify interferences with civil rights. Furthermore, ec-
onomic laws are often based on highly debatable economic predictions
and assessments that are not undisputed. In that case, it depends on the
reviewing judge to decide the extent to which he is willing to get involved
in the irrationality of predictions.
In view of the standards and formulas of review, the standard of review
of economic laws is restricted in two respects. First, the Federal Constitu-
tional Court has repeatedly emphasized that the legislature "in the fields
of labor market and social and economic order ... has a particularly wide
discretion in assessment and prediction. '59 This discretionary power,
however, depends on various factors: in particular, the peculiarities of the
subject matter in question, the possibility to form a sufficiently well-
founded opinion, and the significance of the rights at stake. 60 Thus, the
adjudication of the Federal Constitutional Court so far shows different
degrees and standards of review of predictions. They include a review
standard that restricts the court to ask only whether the statute in ques-
56. See HORST EHMKE, WIRTSCHAFT UND VERFASSUNG 467 (1961); Hans Spanner,
Zur Verfassungskontrolle wirtschaftspolitischer Gesetze, DOV 217 (1972). But see PETER J.
TETINGER, RECHTSANWENDUNG UND GERICHTLICHE KONTROLLE IM WIRTSCHAF-
SVERWALTUNGSRECHT 332 (1980); Reiner Schmidt, Staatliche Verantwortung fir die Wirt-
schaf, in III HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHTS § 83 annotation 34 (Josef Isensee & Paul
Kirchhof eds., 2d ed. 1996).
57. See BVerfGE 72, 330 (388).
58. See OssenbOhl, supra note 54, at 11.
59. Ossenbfhil, supra note 54, at 11.
60. See BVerfGE 87, 363 (373).
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tion is evidently faulty, a review standard merely involving the question
of whether the statute is acceptable, and a review standard that enables
the court to thoroughly scrutinize the content and the objectives of the
statute.61 In other words, judicial review goes as far as can be rationally
and plausibly conducted in the light of subjectively verifiable criteria and
standards. As to economic predictions, the emphasis is on the review of
the methodological approaches upon which the predictions are based,
rather than on their results.
In addition, by constituting monitoring and follow-up obligations of the
legislature, the Federal Constitutional Court has created a certain correc-
tive for predictions that afterwards fail to reflect the future development
accurately. 62
3. The Problem of the "Individual Interference Approach"
Judicial review of statutes in light of civil rights necessarily restricts the
constitutional review to assessing the interference in the individual case.
The subject of assessing whether or not economic rights are justified and
not unproportionally restricted is always (only) the concrete challenged
statute that regulates market access, the exercise of a profession, or the
fixing of prices. There is no "collective reflection" on all statutes that
restrict economic rights and freedoms. In other words, the cumulative or
synergetic effects of all statutes restricting occupational liberty remain
outside the scope of consideration. 63 Thus, nobody can define the exact
range of economic freedom that actually remains. It is only perceptible in
each individual case. For example, the processes involved in starting up a
new enterprise often lead to the complaint about the path to economic
independence as being a "bureaucratic hurdling." However, it is also
possible that this picture has the effect of playing down the issue and that
in some cases quantity has already changed into quality. One needs to
recognize that the "individual interference approach" leads to a some-
what hidden overgrowth of economic rights and freedoms by state regula-
tions. It is important to uncover this overgrowth and to find methods of
avoiding such restrictions of freedom.
4. Previous Leading Cases
The standard of review formulas and review schemes for a constitu-
tional review of economic laws show that everything depends on how
firmly the Federal Constitutional Court tightens the reins. At the begin-
ning of the Court's adjudication stands the already mentioned "pharmacy
decision, '64 which declared the public need test for choosing a profession
61. See BVerfGE 50, 290 (332).
62. See CHRISTIAN MAYER, DIE NACHBESSERUNGSPFLICHT DES GESETZGEBERS
(1996).
63. See KLUTH, supra note 52, at 673; Friedhelm Hufen, Berufsfreiheit-Erinnerungan
em Grundrecht, NJW 2913, 2916 (1994).
64. BVerfGE 7, 377.
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to be unconstitutional. Therefore, the decision was seen as a sign of lib-
erty. That was in the year 1958. Today, more than forty years later, the
prevailing feeling is that the Federal Constitutional Court has missed the
chance to broaden the scope of economic freedoms. 65
Considering the numerous and extensive regulations in the field of eco-
nomic law, one might doubt whether the German legal system fully meets
the requirements of an "open market order with free competition," as
postulated by European law. Also, lobby and group interests and an em-
phasis on sticking to tradition have taken a toll on economic policy. The
endless and much-disputed question as to how much state influence the
market can endure, or is even necessary, will hardly ever lead to a con-
sensus. That is why defining borderlines will always be subject to political
battles. In the Federal Republic of Germany the reduction in measures
of exercising influence on the market only makes slow progress. The ne-
cessity of such a reduction is not always completely realized because eco-
nomic laws are always seen individually in terms of their effects on
economic rights and freedoms. What we need are empirically well-
founded and proven data on the cumulative effects of all laws that do
restrict the market, regardless of the time of their enactment, their differ-
ent motives, and their different objectives. Such an empirical study
would be both necessary and likely to verify the general uneasiness about
the statutory restriction of economic rights and freedoms and to promote
efforts in achieving a substantial deregulation.
65. See Hufen, supra note 44; Peter J. Tettinger, Verfassungsrecht und Wirtschaft-
sordnung, DVB1. 679, 684 (1999).
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